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1 Introduction
Impatience is known to be one of the key parameters affecting our consumption decisions over time. It is
now widely accepted that too little valuation of future streams of utility can result in choosing a path of
consumption which might have consumption decreasing over time and thus sacriﬁce future generations
for the sake of high current consumption. Conversely, if current generations value the utility of future
generations by too much, then this requires excessive sacriﬁces from the current generation. At the heart
of this debate is, of course, the commonly raised question of what determines the actual level of the
discount rate. Classical growth models approach this question by suggesting that the discount rate is
a mixture consisting of fashion, foresight, self-control, life-expectancy, habit and a concern for others
(Fisher 1930). However, they treat the discount rate in a somewhat simplistic manner as they do not
allow for changes in it.
The appropriateness of the use of exogenous discount rates in the standard macroeconomic growth
models has recently been questioned by numerous empirical studies (Frederick et al. 2002, Lawrence
1991, Samwick 1998, Portney and Weyant 1999, etc.). As far as empirical evidence is concerned,
Lawrence (1991) ﬁnds that the discount rate of poor households is up to 5% higher than that of rich
households. Similary, Samwick (1998) observes that the discount rate declines with the income level,
and ﬁnally Frederick et al. (2002) conclude in another empirically-founded review that increased wealth
can inﬂuence the discount rates. The empirical evidence therefore clearly concludes that wealth is deci-
sive for the weight we give to the future in current decisions.
Naturally, the past few years have seen a recurring interest in theoretical models with intertempo-
rally dependent preferences which attempt to investigate the key consequences of various sources of
endogeneity in the discount rate (Becker and Mulligan 1997, Epstein and Hynes 1983, Obstfeld 1990,
Das 2003, Pittel 2002, Ayong Le Kama and Schubert 2003). These models nearly exclusively deal with
consumption, a ﬂow variable, as the source of endogenous discounting. They also, nearly exclusively,
utilize a discount rate which is an increasing function of consumption. Our intention is to depart from
that literature and to choose a stock variable which affects the discount rate. This is interesting for several
reasons.
Firstly, it is more in line with the empirical evidence forwarded by the literature on endogenous
discounting. Speciﬁcally, wearguethatwealthaffectsthediscountratebyproposingthatthisisashortcut
for suggesting that wealthier countries have better health standards (Case et al. 2002, Pritchett 1996) and
better insurance markets (Caroll 1997, Banerjee and Newman 1991), both of which generally affects
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the agent’s discount rate negatively (Frederick et al. 2002). We thus propose that the stock of wealth is
assumedtoaffectthelevelofthediscountratenegatively. Thisleadstoadeparturefromthetime-additive
framework of Koopmans (1960) to the recursive framework poineered by Uzawa (1968).
Secondly, utilizing a stock variable has interesting theoretical repercussions as the steady state level
is affected to a different extend than in the previous models. Furthermore, the theoretical analysis here
will help to solve and better understand future models which are built in such a way that the discount
rate is endogenized via a state variable, as the effects of this type of endogenization will be generic for
all stock-type endogenizations.
Another relevant addition of this article to the literature is the discussion of the necessary and suf-
ﬁcient conditions for optimality in the case of a decreasing endogenous discount rate. To be precise,
we will show that there exists a generic incompatibility in continuous time models of endogenous dis-
counting between the requirements imposed by the sufﬁciency conditions and the endogenization of the
discount rate. Speciﬁcally, we demonstrate that, on the one hand the concavity conditions of the Hamil-
tonian require negative utility, a result equivalent to Obstfeld (1990). To compare to Obstfeld (1990) and
others we use the Mangasarian conditions to assess concavity of the Hamiltonian, although the Arrow
and Kurz conditions give the same requirement. On the other hand, and this seems to have been unno-
ticed in the previous literature, the Pontryagin necessary conditions require positive utility for intuitively
plausible results. We show that disregarding the requirement of negative utility imposed by the Man-
gasarian conditions can be a way out of this dilemma. As we will argue this leads to intuitively plausible
conclusions. Most importantly, we will use two methods to demonstrate why an optimal program ex-
ists. The ﬁrst argument is based on the property of saddle-path stability coupled with the Michel (1982)
transversality condition and the second one utilizes Bellman’s principle of optimality. We then use a
simulation in order to further support our argument that positive felicity indeed results in an optimum.
In addition, we draw some policy implications from changes in technology as well as the effect
of the endogenous discount rate on savings and convergence speed. The ﬁnal remark will be on time
consistency.
The article is organized as follows. The next section introduces some empirical backgrounds. The
following section 3 introduces the model. We then discuss about necessary and sufﬁcient conditions
in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 reduces the system and in section 7 we introduce the conﬂict between
Mangasarian requirements and intuition. In the next section we get rid of the Mangasarian condition
and show how this brings the model in line with intution, followed by a discussion of optimality and an
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analysis of the model. Finally, the conclusion.
2 Empirical background
Isthisfeedback, fromwealthtopatience, aviableone? Inthissectionwereviewsomeempiricalevidence
supporting this hypothesis.
As suggested above, our treatment of wealth here will be based upon a broad view of wealth by
taking a combination of physical capital and including human capital (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
1995). This will allow to place the model in a wider context.1
The hypothesis that there exist some factors which shape our preferences can already be traced back
to B¨ ohm-Bawerk (1889) and Fisher (1930). B¨ ohm-Bawerk believed that any analysis of intertemporal
choice ought to include the “effective desire of accumulation”. He therefore proposed several objective
as well as subjective factors which he believed to be the underlying psychological determinants of time
preference. The two main objective factors were the projected future wealth as well as risk. This was
later supported by Fisher, who suggested that “poverty bears down heavily on all portions of a man’s
expected life. But it increases the want for immediate income even more than it increases the want for
future income.” (1930, pp.732) As our analysis will be based upon an inﬁnitely-lived agent approach,
we shall concentrate on the two factors noted above, wealth and risk.2 We can therefore introduce the
following determinants of the discount rate (ρ), consisting of physical wealth (PW), human wealth (HW),
mortality (M) and other risks (OR):









The effect of the variables on the discount rate is clear even in the early writings - wealth decreases the
discount rate and risk increases it. In the subsequent paragraphs we shall be more speciﬁc and investigate
the relationship between the variables determining the discount rate itself.
We shall ﬁrstly take a look at the effect of physical and human wealth on the discount rate and the
variables in question. Fielding and Torres (2005) estimate the strength of the relationship between several
factors, including wealth, health and education for case of 41 developing countries. Their measure of
1For an endogenous discounting model which separates human capital from physical capital see Fall and Schumacher
(2006).
2Frederick et al. (2002) have an excellent survey with more reference to the subjective factors.
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wealth is of particular usefulness here, as it is based upon a broader measure of wealth than standard
empirical analysis that only refers to income. They build an index of wealth which includes variables
like presence of an electricity supply, possession of radio, TV or car, ﬂush toilet, etc. Then they estimate
that improvements in physical wealth and improvements in human wealth lead to lower mortality rates.
Important is that their results are robust even across countries, pointing at a rather uniform effect of the
variables in question.
This ﬁnding has been conﬁrmed over and over again. Grossman (2003) and Grossman and Kaestner
(1997) review the literature on the relationship between human wealth and health. Their main conclusion
suggests that the variable which has the highest correlation with health is human wealth. To give some
magnitude to this effect, Elias (2003) has related the death rates to the educational attainments for the
USA for white males. From the 45 to 64 years old who have less than 12 years of schooling, the death per
100,000 inhabitants were 1304, whereas the deaths for those who have more than 13 years of schooling
was less than half, 510 people. These ﬁndings also seem robust over time. Similary, Kitagwa and Hauser
(1973) utilizing data from the 1960 Census Records for the USA conclude that, even after controlling
for income, human wealth has a signiﬁcant negative relationship with mortality rates. Based on different
data, these results are conﬁrmed by Feldman et al. (1989), Pappas et al. (1993), Preston and Elo (1995),
Richard and Barry (1998), and many more.
Therefore, income alone cannot be the reason for a lower mortality rate. This therefore excludes the
possibility that a person with higher income can simply pay his way out of illness. We therefore have to
search for underlying variables which shape the behaviour of people in such a way that they act so as not
to incur the illness in the ﬁrst place.
Clearly an important feedback comes through time preference itself. If I am more patient then I put
more weight on future outcomes today. Therefore, assuming I do not care about my future (ie. a high
discount rate), the high likelihood of developing cancer in old age will not ﬁgure highly in my decision
today to chain smoke. On the contrary, a high preference for the future will make me look cancer
directly in the eye and will most likely stop me from smoking. It has now been widely proposed that
human wealth has this large inﬂuence on time preference. There exists a strong literature suggesting that
higher human wealth reduces smoking (e.g. de Walque 2004, Sander 1995, Kenkel 1991) and obesity
(Nayga 2001), thus has a negative impact on mortality. We can therefore write:




,M(HW, PW), OR |{z}
(+)
)
4Endogenous Discounting and Wealth Accumulation
Wealth as a possible source of endogenous discounting has also been proposed by Becker and Mulli-
gan (1997) who conclude that ﬁnancial asset inequality grows as cohorts age, a sign that ﬁnancial assets
affect preferences itself. Similarly, Deaton and Paxson (1994) show that human capital inequality grows
at cohorts age, again a sign that human capital affects preferences.
Other arguments for a broad wealth effect on discounting can be forwarded on intuitive grounds.
For example, if John expects being rich when old, then John will surely look forward to this situation.
However, if he expects to be poor, he will prefer not to think about the future at all. Put differently, if one
expects not to get anything out of life, then one will prefer not to think about the future at all.
Similar reason can be forwarded based on an argument by Parﬁt (1984). Parﬁt suggests that “we
care less about our future because we know that less of what we are now... will survive into the further
future.” Discounting thus reﬂects the expected change in personal identity. If I compare myself with my
possible future self when taking decisions, then I might be inclined to ask: If my future self is rich, then
am I going to look forward to being this future self? If I am thus looking forward to a future self which is
wealthier, then I will be more inclined to associate myself with this future self and thus put more weight
on this future self in my current decisions, than if this future self is poor.
Our analysis therefore allows to conclude the following determinants of the discount rate, where we
combine PW and HW into k:






) =⇒ ρ = ρ(k)
In the subsequent analysis we shall simply take the other risks and factors as exogenously given and
allow them to determine an exogenous level of the discount rate below which the discount rate cannot
fall, ˆ ρ. Therefore, the determinant of the discount rate which we focus on is a combination of physical
as well as human wealth, which gives a broad measure of wealth as in Mankiw (1995) or Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995).
3 The Model
The model is based on an inﬁnitely-lived agent approach where the agent obtains utility from consump-
tion. In addition, his wealth affects the discount rate negatively. Then, wealth can be accumulated
by investing but is reduced by consumption and constant depreciation. The inﬁnitely-lived agent then
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     
     
˙ k(t) = f(k(t)) − c(t) − δk(t), ∀t
˙ θ(t) = ρ(k(t)), ∀t
k(t) ≥ 0, c(t) ≥ 0, ∀t,
withk(0) given.
Assumption 1 We impose that the production function f : R+ → R+ follows standard assumptions of
concavity, such that f(0) = 0, f0(k) > 0, f00(k) < 0. We also impose the standard Inada conditions,
given by limk→0 f0(k) = ∞, and limk→∞ f0(k) = 0. Finally, we assume that f−1 exists and is unique.
Assumption 2 The utility function u : R+ → R is at least twice continuously differentiable and has the
standard properties of u0(c) > 0, u00(c) < 0, ∀c. We assume u0(0) = ∞.
The assumption u0(0) = ∞ allows to concentrate on interior solutions only. It corresponds to the
assumption that at least a minimum amount of consumption is required for the continuation of the gen-
erations. We shall also sometimes resort to the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function,
which has the functional form of u(c) = c1−σ
1−σ , with σ ≥ 0.
Assumption 3 We assume that the at least twice differentiable discount rate ρ(k) : R+ → R++, has the
properties limk→∞ ρ(k) = ˆ ρ > 0, ρ0(k) < 0, ρ00(k) > 0, and ρ0(k) < ∞, ∀k.
The assumption on the production and utility function are standard and do not require any justiﬁcation.
The assumption for the discount rate has been motivated in the previous section. Deﬁning the opti-
mization problem by introducing the discount factor as another constraint allows the Hamiltonian to be
independent of time which greatly simpliﬁes the analysis.3
4 Necessary Conditions
The Hamilton of the above system writes
(5) H = u(c(t))e−θ(t) + λ(t)[f(k(t)) − c(t) − δk(t)] − µ(t)ρ(k(t)).
3Throughout the article we use x
0(y) = ∂x/∂y, ˙ x = ∂x/∂t.
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The Pontryagin necessary conditions for optimality are
u0(c(t))e−θ(t) = λ(t), (6)
λ(t)[f0(k(t)) − δ] − µ(t)ρ0(k(t)) = −˙ λ(t), (7)
−u(c(t))e−θ(t) = ˙ µ(t), (8)
lim
t→∞
H(t) = 0, (9)
where equation (9) gives the transversality condition of the system.4 As µ(t) represents the implicit value
of relaxing the constraint (5) by one unit, we expect that µ(t) should give us the prospective, discounted






This result is of course only valid if the utility functional converges to zero when time goes to inﬁnity,
which will be the case when utility is ﬁnite and the discount rate is positive. Hence we know that
µ(t) < (>)0 if u(c(t)) < (>)0, which is important for the second-order sufﬁciency conditions.
5 Sufﬁciency Conditions
To assess the concavity of the Hamiltonian we make use of the Mangasarian conditions. However, even
the weaker Arrow and Kurz conditions have the same requirement on utility. We state the result in the
next proposition.
Proposition 1 Given the optimization problem (4) a necessary condition for the Mangasarian sufﬁcient
conditions to be satisﬁed is given by u(c(t)) ≤ 0.













4For this kind of transversality condition, see Michel (1982).
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The requirement for negative deﬁniteness is that the principal minors alternate in sign. The principal
minors are given by
|M1| = u00(c(t))e−θ(t), (11)
|M2| = u00(c(t))e−θ(t)[λ(t)f00(k(t)) − µ(t)ρ00(k(t))], (12)
|M3| = [u00(c(t))u(c(t)) − u0(c(t))2]e−2θ(t)[λ(t)f00(k(t)) − µ(t)ρ00(k(t))]. (13)
Given our regularity conditions on the utility function we know that |M1| < 0. Hence, |M2| must
be positive, which only holds if λ(t)f00(k(t)) − µ(t)ρ00(k(t)) < 0. Given λ > 0 and f00(k(t)) <
0, a necessary condition is that µ(t)ρ00(k(t)) > λ(t)f00(k(t)). Given that the principal minors must
alternate in sign we must have that |M3| < 0. Given the requirement on |M2|, this necessarily imposes
u00(c(t))u(c(t)) − u0(c(t))2 > 0. Hence, a necessary condition is that u(c(t)) ≤ 0.
In the case of a CRRA utility function, this condition is also sufﬁcient. Given that we must impose
u(c(t)) ≤ 0, this implies that µ(t) < 0, ∀t. Hence, For ρ00(k) > 0 the combination of u(c(t)) ≤ 0 and
µ(t)ρ00(k(t)) > λ(t)f00(k(t)) are sufﬁcient conditions for optimality.
6 Solving the Model
Transforming the Pontryagin necessary conditions from (6) till (8) and disregaring time subscripts for
convenience, we arrive at the following system of dynamical equations:









˙ k = f(k) − c − δk, (15)
˙ µ = −u(c)e−θ. (16)
It is possible to reduce this system to a system in two dynamical equations, only. This we do as follows.
The ﬁrst observation is that the Hamiltonian of the above system is autonomous. We can therefore show
the following. As we have that H = u(c)e−θ + λ˙ k − µ˙ θ, then we know that necessary conditions
for optimality are ∂H
∂c = 0, ∂H
∂k = −˙ λ, ∂H
∂θ = ˙ µ, as well as ∂H
∂λ = ˙ k and ﬁnally ∂H
∂µ = ˙ θ. Taking
partial differentials of the Hamiltonian with respect to time we obtain dH
dt = ∂H
∂t + ∂H





˙ θ + ∂H
∂λ
˙ λ − ∂H
∂µ ˙ µ. Given the conditions for optimality we can cancel out and are left with dH
dk = ∂H
∂t .
As the Hamiltonian is autonomous, we also have that ∂H
∂t = 0. Given the transversality condition
limt→∞ H(t) = 0, this gives us that the optimized H∗(t) = 0, ∀t.
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Hence we can transform the Hamiltonian to
(17) µ =
u(c)e−θ + u0(c)e−θ ˙ k
ρ(k)
,
which we then can substitute in the system of equations (14) - (15) to get the following system













˙ k = f(k) − c − δk. (19)
This reduced-form system captures the complete dynamics of the system. From this we go on to discuss
the effect of imposing the Mangasarian sufﬁciency conditions, as given by u(c) < 0.
7 The problem of negatice felicity
For ρ0(k) < 0 it is possible to show that a steady state always exists, although it might be a unique or
a multiple steady state. Then, it is also possible to demonstrate that the system is saddle-path stable if
a certain curvature condition on the production function is satisﬁed. Without providing further proof of
the required conditions for existence of steady states as well as the dynamics, we are now going to show
the problem of using negative utility with endogenous discounting models. First, we take the steady state
version of equations (18), given by






In the original Ramsey case, we have ρ0(k) = 0, ∀k. Therefore, the smaller is ρ, the closer is the optimal
capital stock to the Golden Rule level.5 Hence, impatience is something “bad” in a sense, which keeps
one from attaining the highest possible level of consumption.6 So now, if we take the case of ρ0(k) < 0,
then we would expect that a policy maker would try to increase optimal capital stock, as this brings him
closer to the Golden Rule. This means that increases in capital both decrease the level of discounting
and increase the level of consumption over time. However, given we impose the Mangasarian sufﬁciency
conditions, namely u(c) < 0, we directly see that the last term on the right-hand side is positive. Hence,
negative utility and a decreasing discount rate, which should be intuitively favourable towards the golden
5The Golden Rule level is the maximum sustainable consumption level, which in this case is where f
0(k) = δ.
6For early references on critical approaches towards impatience c.f. Marshall (1890), Pigou (1920) or Ramsey (1928).
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rule, make us choose a steady state further away from the golden rule than the exogenous discounting
case. This is certainly in conﬂict with intuition. On the converse (and for the purpose of better illustration
only), an increasing discount rate would take us closer to the golden rule and can even make us choose a
steady state at the golden rule (if ρ(¯ k) =
ρ0(¯ k)u(¯ c)
ρ(¯ k)u0(¯ c)) or make us choose a higher level of capital stock than
the golden rule level. Again, this seems to be at contradiction with the standard Ramsey exercise, where
lower discount rates are necessary to take us closer to the golden rule, and not increasing discount rates.
Especially in the case of a discount rate decreasing with the level of capital, one would expect that there
is incentive to accumulate more capital than in the exogenous discounting case. What goes wrong?
The easy answer ﬁrst. As can be seen, the last term on the right-hand side is positive for ρ0(k) < 0 if
u(c) < 0. So, negative utility seems be the source of the problem.7
To provide more foundation to this result we transform equation (14), by substituting for µ(t) its
optimal value, which is the discounted prospective value of utility on the optimal path. We therefore
obtain










We are going to analyze the last part of this equation, which helps us in understanding the paradox raised











The term above is the ratio of two Volterra derivatives. The numerator of this ratio is the Volterra deriva-
tive of the utility functional with respect to capital. The denominator is the Volterra derivate with respect
to consumption, which is always positive, implying that higher consumption has a positive marginal
effect on the utility functional. Given our requirements imposed by the Mangasarian second-order con-
ditions of negative utility the numerator is negative, suggesting that higher capital reduces overall util-
ity. Thus, in the case of endogenous discounting with negative utility, discounting becomes something
“good” in the sense that higher discounting actually increases utility. This, of course, is the result of
having the level of utility itself in the Volterra derivative. We therefore do not only have to look at
marginal changes, but also at the sign of utility. Conclusively, we lose invariance with respect to afﬁne
transformations. Speciﬁcally, utility functions give rise to opposite conclusions if utility is either nega-
tive or positive. However, as utility must be negative for sufﬁcient conditions to hold, we are left with a
7I am most grateful to Jakub Growiec for providing the key hint for this.
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dilemma. Negative utility is required by the Mangasarian conditions, whereas it leads to counterintuitive
implications from the necessary condition. Apparently we have to dispose of one of the assumptions.
Here we would like to point at the way the current literature deals with this situation. Firstly, Obst-
feld (1990) notices that sufﬁciency conditions require negative utility and then analyzes the model with
a discount rate increasing in consumption. Clearly, his analysis is subject to the same criticism, as an
increasing discount rate with a negative utility gives incentive to the policy maker to increase consump-
tion as higher discounting increases prospective utility if utility is negative. The same requirements are
imposed by Epstein (1987), Shi and Epstein (1993), to name just a few of the articles.
Ayong le Kama and Schubert (2005) impose a negative utility for sufﬁciency conditions and assume
that the discount rate increases in the level of environmental quality. Similarly, Pittel (2002) assumes that
the discount rate is a function of pollution and imposes a negative utility. The same reasoning applies
as before, as the policy maker has an incentive to increase environmental quality simply because it leads
to a higher discount rate and thus a level of utility closer to zero, which is the upper bound of the utility
function which they assume.
Das (2003) uses a discount rate decreasing in the level of consumption and assumes positive utility
throughout. She does not talk about Mangasarian conditions, knowing that they will not hold given her
assumption on utility.8
Overall, it seems that assuming negative utility is required for sufﬁciency by the second-order con-
ditions, but leads to counterintuitive results. This is one unfortunate moral of this article. However, it by
no means is the end of the story. It seems that the Mangasarian condition is indeed only sufﬁcient for
optimality, but not necessary.
8 The case of u(c) ≥ 0
We shall now analyze what happens when we disregard the requirement of the second-order conditions.
We therefore assume that utility is non-negative on its whole domain, such that u : R+ → R+.9 In this
case we only know - for now - that the ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary, not sufﬁcient. We will obtain
8However, to be fair, her solution is still optimal. Nevertheless, she does not seem to be aware of the problem imposed by
negative utility.
9This implies that the utility function is variant to afﬁne transformations, which we therefore must rule out. Utility is
only invariant to positive similarity transformations. Hence, utility is measurable on a ratio-scale with full comparability. See
d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002) for details.
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the following dynamic system:













˙ k = f(k) − c − δk. (24)
This time, the term in round brackets of equation (23) has the required sign throughout, and it will
affect the steady state positively in the case of decreasing discount rates and negatively if one assumes
increasing discount rates. Of course, the steady state ought to be affected by this Volterra ratio term due
to the recursive nature of the problem. This is in contrast to the model forwarded by Obstfeld (1990)
and e.g. Das (2003), where the discount rate is endogenized via consumption and this term is non-
existent. In these standard endogenizations, the optimal steady state can never be to the right of the
Golden Rule level. This, of course, is questionable and seems somewhat restrictive, especially when one
has the cumulative effect of the discount rate on the utility functional in mind, which can be much more
important than the effect of consumption itself. This suggests that if the discount rate is very responsive
to changes in wealth, then there ought to be incentive to overaccumulate wealth in comparison to the
exogenous discounting case. Overall, in the endogenization via wealth, the policy maker will need to
consider how to trade wealth for consumption given this additional feedback of wealth on the discount
rate, where higher consumption implies lower wealth and therefore higher discounting.
We now want to analyze the steady state and dynamics of this model. For this we take the steady
state versions of (23) and (24) to get






f(k) − δk = c. (26)
We then constrain the domain of wealth to the relevant one only. Firstly, we don’t need to concern
ourselves with k > ¯ k, where ¯ k is the level of capital that solves f(k) = δk. Also, from (25), we know
thatthesteadystatecurveforconsumptionisnotdeﬁnedfork < k, wherek > 0solvesf0(k)−δ = ρ(k).
Therefore, for the subsequent analysis, it is sufﬁcient to concentrate on the interval k ∈ [k,¯ k] only. For
simplicity later, we also deﬁne ˜ k, which solves f0(k) = δ.
As can be seen from equation (25) the steady state can be either to the left or to the right of the
Golden Rule, depending how strongly the discount rate responds to changes in wealth.
The steady state curves have the following shape. Equation (26) is standard and goes from {c,k} =
{0,0} to {c,k,} = {0,¯ k}. Equation (25) is only satisﬁed if, when k → 0 =⇒ c → −∞; and if when
k → ¯ k =⇒ c > 0.
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Therefore, in the case of a decreasing discount rate, the steady state curve for consumption goes from
−∞ to a positive number in the interval k ∈ (0,¯ k]. Due to the continuity of both steady state curves for
consumption and capital, this implies that a steady state always exists.10
We take the total derivative of the steady state curve of capital, equation (25), and consumption,













= f0(k) − δ, (28)
where m(k) =
ρ00(k)ρ(k)−ρ0(k)2
ρ(k)2 with m(k) >
< 0 and n(k) =
u0(c)2−u00(c)u(c)
u0(c)2 > 0. Then the steady state
curve (28) has the familiar shape of ﬁrst increasing, reaching the maximum at ˜ k, and decreasing there-
after, until crossing the k-axis at ¯ k. The denominator of equation (27), given our assumption u(c) ≥ 0,
is negative. The nominator is positive if f00(k) − ρ0(k) > m(k)u(c)/u0(c). We will make use of the
subsequent proposition in order to establish in which range of the variables we can sign the nominator.
The following proposition establishes a sufﬁcient condition for a unique steady state. In the rest of
the article we are going to concentrate on a unique equilibrium only. The case of multiple steady states
has been analyzed by Schumacher (2006).
Proposition 2 A sufﬁcient condition for a unique steady state is given by
(29) f00(k) < ρ0(k) + m(k)
u(c)
u0(c)




∀k ∈ [k,¯ k]. Otherwise, multiple steady states could exist.
Proof 2 See Appendix.
This sufﬁcient condition for a unique steady state is rather strong and it can be weakened at the cost of
tractability. Also, for the case of the exogenous discount rate, this condition reduces to f00(k) < 0, which
is the standard concavity condition for the Ramsey model.
Hence, having the preceding sufﬁciency condition for a unique steady state in mind, equation (29),
this implies that given ρ0(k) < 0 , then dc/dk > 0 for k < ˜ k, and dc/dk >
< 0 for k > ˜ k, although if
dc/dk < 0, then the decrease must be slow enough to satisfy the conditions for a unique steady state.
10This argument however requires the minor assumption of ρ
0(k) < ∞, ∀k.
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We can show that the steady state curve for consumption reduces to the one in the Ramsey model.
From equation (27) we obtain dk/dc → 0 when ρ0(k) → 0, ∀k, which is equivalent to the familiar vertial
˙ c = 0 line in the Ramsey model. Finally, the steady state curves in case of a unique steady state will
approximately take the form as in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Phase Diagram









f00(k) − ρ0(k) − m(k)
u(c)









denoted by λ1,2. As the trace is Tr(J) = λ1 + λ2, and the determinant is Det(J) = λ1λ2, it sufﬁces to
show that the trace is positive and the determinant is negative. We can thus show that the trace of this
matrix is given by Tr(J) = ρ(k) > 0, while the determinant is negative if







It thus follows trivially that if the sufﬁcient condition for a unique steady state is satisﬁed then the system
is saddle-path stable.
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When comparing the condition for saddle-path stability to the traditional Ramsey case, then for
ρ(k) = ρ the above condition reduces to f00(k) < 0, which is again the familiar Ramsey condition.
Therefore, this model provides a tractable and direct extension of the Ramsey case.
9 Can we assure Optimality?
In the ﬁrst sections we noticed that the second-order sufﬁciency conditions, the Mangasarian conditions,
require (minimally) a negative utility function. However, as the utility function must be non-negative
for intuitively correct results, it is important to check if the Mangasarian conditions can be replaced by
a different set of conditions, which nevertheless allow for the existence of an optimal program. This
section then deals with two speciﬁc ways to derive the existence of an optimal program without resorting
to Mangasarian lemma. We then show with a numerical example, utilizing positive utility, that indeed
the Mangasarian condition is not necessary for an optimum.
9.1 Optimality via saddle-path stability
A simple way to argue that the path obtained by the Pontryagin condition and the transversality condition
is globally optimal is by making use of the saddle path stability coupled with the transversality condition.
We know by the saddle-path stability of the dynamic system that there exists only one path which satisﬁes
the Pontryagin conditions and the transversality condition. This is the saddle path which leads to the
steady state. Any other path will diverge for different initial choices of consumption. This is enough
information for optimality. Hence, in this case, the Pontryagin conditions coupled with the transversality
condition give rise to an optimal path which maximizes the utility functional, such that H(k∗,c∗) ≥
H(k,c), ∀{c,k} which are feasible.
9.2 Optimality via Bellman’s principle of optimality
It is possible to discretize the model in order to make use of Bellman’s equation. Discretizing a continu-
ous time model with recursive preferences has already been used in Drugeon (1996) and Chang (1994).
We can deﬁne the value function as
V (k) = max
{c}
U(c,k) s.t.
˙ k = f(k) − c − δk, where k(0) > 0 given.
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The method of discretizing goes as follows. We approximate by splitting the utility integral at time
 > 0, such that







0 ρ(k(s))dsdt + e−
R 
0 ρ(k(s))dsV (k(t + ))

.
Now, moving V (k) to the right, diving by  and letting  → 0, gives the following discretized version of
the above problem:
(32) 0 = max
c
n
u(c) − ρ(k)V (k) + V 0(k)˙ k
o
.
Note that this is not an approximation any longer. In order to arrive at equation (32) we made use of
the Leibnitz rule as well as the differentiability of the value function. The differentiability of the value
function is not intuitive however, but can be approached indirectly via use of the Volterra derivative
(Ryder and Heal 1973). By the convexity of the technology set (see e.g. Becker and Boyd 1992), we
know that an optimal path exists.
The ﬁrst order conditions then give
(33) u0(c) = V 0(k),
and the second-order condition for optimality is
(34) u00(c) < 0.
Due to the concavity of the utility function this implies that second-order conditions go through.
Let us then check whether the optimality conditions are equivalent to the Pontryagin conditions.
From equation (33) we know that optimal c is a function of k, such that we can write c(k). Substituting
this in (32) and differentiating with respect to k, plus making use of the envelop theorem, gives
(35) 0 = −ρ0(k)V (k) + V 00(k)˙ k + V 0(k)(f0(k) − δ − ρ(k)).
As is well-known, V 0(k) = λ, where λ is the shadow price of capital. Also, by application of the chain




∂t, wherefore V 00(k)˙ k = ˙ λ. Left to determine is V (k). We can conclude that
V (k) is the prospective optimal value of utility. Hence, equation (35) corresponds exactly to equation
(23) and therefore the necessary condition derived from Bellman’s equation indeed correspond to those
from Pontryagin.
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9.3 A Simulation
The previous arguments were established to show that the Mangasarian conditions are indeed only sufﬁ-
cient and not necessary to characterize an optimum. We now give a numerical example which provides
the last touch to the previous results.
Figure 2: Total Welfare from different initial consumption
We freely choose the following explicit functional forms and parameters: f(k) = Akα, u(c) =
c1−σ/(1 − σ), ρ(k) = ¯ ρ/(1 + βk); A = 0.3, α = 0.3, β = 0.04, δ = 0.05, ¯ ρ = 0.1, σ = 0.9. Choosing
σ < 1insuresapositiveutilitythroughout. Theinitialconditionforcapitalischosenatk(0) = 0.774931.
The unique steady state of this numerical example is given at {c∗,k∗} = {0.268353,2.83411}.
Then, Figure 2 shows the total welfare obtainable from different initial values for consumption.
The optimal value of consumption, here denoted as c∗, is derived by the backward integration method
introduced in Brunner and Strulik (2000). As can be seen, total welfare increases when converging to the
optimal initial value of consumption. Therefore, the simulation supports the prior analysis and indeed
suggests that negative utility is not necessary for optimality.
Hence, the fortunate moral of the article is that even though we disregard Mangasarian conditions,
the model is now in line with intuition and it can be shown that the dynamic path chosen still leads to an
optimum.
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10 Discussion and Analysis
This section will utilize the results of the model to assess several speciﬁc questions. Firstly, what is the
effect of changing technology? Secondly, what can be said about the savings behaviour in this recursive
model? Thirdly, what implications has this model on the convergence speed? First things ﬁrst.
10.1 The effect of technology
From the steady state equations we can also draw some conclusions on the effect of a higher level of
total factor productivity, A, where we write f(k) = Ag(k), with A > 0. Mathematically, we take partial









= g(k) > 0.
Thus, for increases in total factor productivity the ˙ c = 0 shifts down whereas the ˙ k = 0 line expands.
The intuition is that if capital is more productive, then it is more efﬁcient to increase the level of capital
and thus to reduce the discount rate (for ρ0(k) < 0). An exogenous increase of the marginal effect of
capital on the discount rate also shifts the steady state consumption curve down and right, because it is
then marginally more efﬁcient to increase capital in order to reduce the discount rate than to increase
consumption.
10.2 Effect on savings behaviour
The saving rate is given by s = 1 − c/f(k). We can then calculate the steady state savings rate to
assess what inﬂuence the endogenous discounting has on savings. We shall do this for the familiar Cobb-
Douglas production function, in which case f(k)/k = f0(k)/α holds, as well as for the CRRA utility











We compare this to the steady state savings rate in the exogenous discounting case, which is s∗
ex = αδ
δ+ρ.
As ρ0(k) < 0 and ρ(k) < ρ, it is clear that steady state savings in the endogenous discounting case is
higher than in the exogenous one.
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10.3 Changes in Convergence speed
As is well known, the convergence speed in the original Ramsey model is much too high to match the
data. Hence, we would like to know whether this model is able to generate a convergence speed more in
line with the actual data.
We can approximate the convergence speed with the negative eigenvalue of the linearized system.








































We shall use speciﬁc functional forms as well as common parameter ranges in order to draw some
conclusions. The functional forms are f(k) = Akα, ρ(k) =
ρ
1+βk, u(c) = c1−σ
1−σ , with parameters given
by A = 2, α = 0.3, β = 0.03, δ = 0.05, ρ = 0.3, σ = 0.9. The conditions on the discount rate
imply that for extremely poor economies who have no wealth, the discount rate is ρ = 0.3, whereas for
economies at their steady state level the discount rate is approximately ρ = 0.05. This approximately
conforms to empirically veriﬁed observations (Frederick et al. 2002).
Mankiw, Phelps and Romer (1995) estimate the convergence speed for the United States. Their
rough estimate is at around 4 percent. In comparison to this the convergence speed with the exogenous
discounting Ramsey model is approximately 42 percent, which is much too high. The endogenous
discounting model presented here gives an approximate convergence speed of 3 percent, which is much
more in line with the empirical data.
10.4 Time consistency
Models which utilize a variable discount rate are usually subject to problems of time consistency. This,
here, is not the case due to the clear recursive nature of the model, wherefore the planner’s future self
will take the same choices as his current self. Irrespectively of when the planner decides, he will always
follow the same course. This, in other words, is time consistency.
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It is possible to imagine a case where the planner is not fully aware of his preference change, such
that ρ(γk), where γ ∈ [0,1]. If γ = 0, then we have the situation of a completely na¨ ıve planner who
believes his preferences are not changing. However, when he then “arrives” in the future he notices that
his preferences are different from those with which he initially took his decisions and are different from
those which he expected to have. In a discrete version of the model with a completely na¨ ıve planner
(such that γ = 0), this implies that the planner takes the decision such that
(39) u(c1) + βu(c2) + β2u(c3) + ...
However, upon arriving at time t = 2, he notices that his preferences have changed and are actually
β(k) > β. Hence the implication is that the preferences from period t = 2 onwards viewed at t = 1 are
u(c2) + βu(c3), whereas from period t = 2 viewed the preferences are u(c2) + β(k)u(c3). Therefore,
equality of marginal (discounted) utility over time does not hold any longer, which implies time incon-
sistent behaviour and inefﬁcient allocations, as the planner will revise his optimal plans from period to
period.
This na¨ ıve behaviour is particularly troublesome when decisions span over a very large horizon.
For example, if the policy maker believes that his true discount factor is β, but his actual one β0, and if
β = 0.9 and β0 = 0.91, then these small differences over a horizon of 60 years accumulate to a difference
of approximately 100% in value. Clearly, the closer is γ to one, i.e. the less na¨ ıve the planner, the more
efﬁcient will be his long-run planning.
11 Conclusion
In this article we introduce a broad measure of wealth as a source of endogenous discounting. We assess
the implications of this endogenization by assuming that wealth decreases the discount rate. The intuition
for a decreasing discount rate is that higher wealth is a proxy for the observation that in general, countries
with a higher wealth (physical and human) have a lower discount rate. This is due to the fact that physical
wealth and human wealth have strong implications on mortality rates, expectations about the future and
self-awareness.
We assess the Mangasarian second-order conditions for an optimum and notice that they require neg-
ative utility. The same condition is imposed by the Arrow and Kurz conditions. After solving the model
by deriving the Pontryagin necessary conditions and obtaining a reduced-form dynamical system, we
notice that even though the assumption of a decreasing discount rate is favourable towards the golden
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rule consumption level, we ﬁnd that, given we impose negative utility as required by the Mangasarian
conditions, the steady state is generally further away from the golden rule. We notice that this counterin-
tuitive result is solely due to the negative utility function, an assumption which we ﬁnd again and again
in the models of endogenous discounting. A possible way around this is to dispense looking at Man-
gasarian sufﬁciency conditions and simply assume a positive utility function. This way of dealing with
the problem has however one drawback. We don’t know whether our necessary conditions for optimality
are also sufﬁcient for a maximum. This problem we attack in two ways. One, by an argument suggesting
that saddle path stability and transversality condition imply there exists only one path which is optimal.
Two, by resorting to Bellman’s equation, which provides a different sufﬁciency condition but the same
Pontryagin conditions. Finally, we make use of a numerical example which supports our ﬁndings that
negative utility is not necessary for optimality.
Then we show that even though we disregard the Mangasarian conditions by assuming a positive
utility function throughout, we arrive at conclusions which are in line with our intuition. We assess the
implications of the model on changes in technology and the implication of endogenous discounting on
savings and convergence speed.
Improvements in technology imply a higher level of steady state capital but either a higher or lower
level of consumption, depending on whether the steady state was to the left or to the right of the Golden
Rule. The direct effect of higher productivity increases the steady state consumption level, whereas the
indirect effect via the effect of wealth on discounting reduces the level of steady state consumption.
We notice that the saving rate is higher in the endogenous discounting case and the convergence
speed is much slower and in line with empirical evidence, in contrast to the standard Ramsey model and
the endogenous discounting case via consumption.
Finally, we discuss the implication of a na¨ ıve planner who believes his preferences do not change or
do not change completely. We conclude that this behaviour is particularly troublesome and leads to time
inconsistent and inefﬁcient allocations.
Overall, this model seems to conform better with empirical evidence than the standard Ramsey model
and the method of endogenizing via consumption.
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12 Appendix
We use the steady state equations






f(k) − δk = c.





Then G0(k) = f00(k) − ρ0(k) − m(k)
u(c)
u0(c) − [f0(k) − δ]
ρ0(k)
ρ(k) n(k), where c = f(k) − δk. We know
that limk→0 G(k) = ∞ and limk→¯ k G(k) = z, where z is a negative but ﬁnite number. Hence, the
curve G(k) starts from positive inﬁnity to negative ﬁnite for k = ¯ k. As each argument of G(k) is
continuous, we know that G(k) is continuous. Therefore, a sufﬁcient condition for a unique steady state
is then that G(k) = 0 only for one k. This is satisﬁed when G0(k) < 0, ∀k. This condition holds for
f00(k) < ρ0(k) + m(k)
u(c)
u0(c) + [f0(k) − δ]
ρ0(k)
ρ(k) n(k). 
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